Notre Dame Law Review
Volume 31 | Issue 3

Article 10

5-1-1956

Book Reviews
Roger J. Kiley
John W. Bricker
John S. Gonas

Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.nd.edu/ndlr
Part of the Law Commons
Recommended Citation
Roger J. Kiley, John W. Bricker & John S. Gonas, Book Reviews, 31 Notre Dame L. Rev. 520 (1956).
Available at: http://scholarship.law.nd.edu/ndlr/vol31/iss3/10

This Book Review is brought to you for free and open access by NDLScholarship. It has been accepted for inclusion in Notre Dame Law Review by an
authorized administrator of NDLScholarship. For more information, please contact lawdr@nd.edu.

BOOK REVIEWS
FOUNTAIN OF JUSTICE. By John C. H. Wu.' New York: Sheed

& Ward, 1955. Pp. ix, 287. $3.75. This is an interesting book by
a remarkable man. Mr. Wu was born and reared in China, was
converted to Christianity as a Methodist and later became a
Catholic. He pursued post-graduate studies in the law school of
the University of Michigan where he won considerable fame as
a correspondent of the late Judge Oliver Wendell Holmes with
whom he shared an ardent love of the common law. In China,
he has been a lawyer, judge, legislator, and Minister Plenipotentiary to the Vatican. He is now a professor of law at Seton
Hall University. And Mr. Wu is the father of thirteen children.
The book is written from a wealth of experience in, and an
amazing range of reading in the literature of, both the East and
the West. Mr. Wu compares with facility the ideas of Aristotle
and the latter's Chinese pupil, Mencius, and those of Confucius
and St Thomas Aquinas. He writes with a charming style, blending rich and colorful figurative prose, suggestive of his native
land, with western legal writing. Being a development of several papers and addresses read and delivered to principally
Catholic audiences, the book is oriented to Christianity and,
primarily to, the Catholic Faith. It deals with the natural law
and the common law from the viewpoint of religion.
The main title is taken from a quotation of Lord Mansfield,
who said "the common law works itself pure by rules drawn
from the fountain of justice."'2 In Mr. Wu's study the fountain
of justice is the natural law. "[T]he common law is like a beautiful river .... [T]he source of this river lies in the higher regions,
in a mountain whose immovability
and immensity make it a
3
perfect symbol of sublimity.
The "Prologue" recalls "Some Basic Notions": the need of
a philosophy of law, the definition of law, the various kinds of
law and the different theories of jurisprudence. "Part One" is
entitled "The Natural Law and Our Common Law" and its
sections cover "The Common Law in Its Old Home," in England, and "The Common Law in Its New Home," in America.
"Part Two" is entitled "In the School of Christ." The "Epilogue"
is "The Art Of Law."
I Former Chief Justice of the Provisional Court of Shanghai; Professor
of Law, Seton Hall University School of Law.
2 Text at 64, quoting from Lord Mansfield's opinion in Omychund v.

Barker, I Atk. 22, 26 Eng. Rep. 15 (1744).
3 Id. at 126.
(520)
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The basic notions are the classical ideas underlying the
scholastic theory of natural law and .the definition of law is
that of St. Thomas Aquinas. Mr. Wu states that St. Thomas'
definition comprehends all kinds of law. This is not to say that
he disagrees with Mortimer Adler's view that natural law and
positive law cannot both be comprehended in the definition
unless one is taken as the analogy of the other.4 In proving the
need of a philosophy of law Mr. Wu states that in the majority
of cases the question is "at large" and that philosophy is needed
for decision as the "final arbiter." The term "at large" presumably means an absence of binding precedent. The experience of the reviewer in the Appellate Court of Illinois is that
the cases in which the question is "at large" are very few.
This does not mean, however, that there is no need of a philosophy
of law in that court.
Reading "Part One" was a delightful experience, theophilosophic rather than philosophic and poetic-religious rather than
legal. This part was clearly a labor of love for Mr. Wu and
his devotion to common law shines through the chapters which
take the reader quickly through the development of the common
law from its birth as a "Cradle Christian" (Roman law being
a "deathbed convert") in the early middle ages to the English
Revolution of 1688; and through -its development in America
from the time of the Mayflower landing to the Steel Seizure,
Rosenberg and Segregation cases. The emphasis in these chapters appears to be upon common law and Christianity. Natural law philosophy is present but rather as a background
than as an element. In this part of the book, Mr. Wu frankly
states that he will approach the subject, "The Natural Law
and Our Common Law," as if the common law was Our Lady
and natural law the Divine Infant in her arms. The Infant
is easier to seek "in the arms of Our Lady." These figures
are extensions of the metaphor "our lady of the common law"
used by Pollock and Cardozo.
In tracing the development of common law from Magna
Carta, to the Year Books, to Bracton, into Shakespeare's plays,
then to Coke, Holt and Mansfield, statements and decisions are
quoted to show the influence of natural law and Christianity
in the thinking of those who inspired the great charter, and in
the decisions of great judges who were responsible for preserving the moral and religious -spirit of common law growth.
So too, in the revitalized life of common law in its "New Home"
after natural law went "underground" in England and departed from common law. Mr. Wu shows how the common
4 Adler, A Question About Law, in ESSAYS ur Th-omrsm 207 (1942).
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law, inspired by natural law, introduced into America by men
of deep religious beliefs, has been nurtured by statesmen and
judges who had imbibed Christianity from their childhood, and
has withstood the onslaughts of skeptics questioning the inspiration.
These delightful chapters of "Part One" may be unsatisfactory to a strict legal philosopher because the treatment of
the natural and common law is not definitive and he might
wonder from time to time as he reads the pages whether
the study is not of common law rather than natural law.
Christ laid the cornerstone for natural law jurisprudence,
and the author points out, He did so in a conversation with
a lawyer. The lawyer asked Him what was the first of all
the commandments. In His answer and His life, Christ raised
the Old Law of Justice to the New Law of Love. For love is
really the end of the law, for the spirit of the law is reflected
in the Golden Rule, "all things therefore whatsoever you would
have men do to you, do you also to them." This, says Mr. Wu,
is the natural law foundation of all human law. Bracton thought
Christ was the Judge of judges as well as the King of kings.
The author agrees and refers to His knowledge of the law of
the Old Testament and how with an application of equity He
softened its rigors, when accused of blasphemy for healing on
the Sabbath.
The mention of Christ in court decisions makes Mr. Wu's
heart "leap for joy" and he finds jurisprudence enriched by
Christianity. This is not Christianity as a religion but as a
"vehicle of the precepts of natural law and justice." One can
understand this joy and yet it would seem that the mention
of the name of Christ in opinions should not of itself stamp
the judge as "great." In this connection the author makes an
interesting statement of the ". . . ironic situation in modern
American jurisprudence. . . . [A]s a general rule, the judges

who used the name of the natural law have rendered wrong
decisions, while the judges who were skeptical of natural law
have reached results which coincide with conclusions of the
two great Encyclicals: Rerum Novarum and Quadragesimo
Anno."5

"The Art of Law" for Mr. Wu is the imitation of Christ.
The excellence of justice is the combination of the true, the
good and the beautiful. Know the truth about the facts, see
the good which is the aim of the law, and make decisions
which are beautiful in their harmony of law and equity and
in the ordering of the legal order to the cosmic order. The
5 Text at 141.
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Christian spirit of the common law is in the true notions of
the dignity of man, of the meaning of the family, and of the
purpose of human law.
It seems to this reviewer that Mr. Wu makes two significant
contributions beyond those already mentioned and implied. One
is the importance he gives to the place of the practical reason
in natural law theory and the other is in advice which he offers
to natural law men of the Catholic Faith.
In various places in his book the author dwells on speculative reason and practical reason: they are operations of the
same faculty but they differ in the ends assigned to each.
The end of speculative reason is truth and deals mainly with
cause and effect. The end of the practical reason is good and
deals mainly with ends and means. Speculative reason deals
with necessary conclusions, practical with conclusions about the
contingent actions of human beings. "Human laws cannot, in
the nature of things, have the unerring quality of scientifically
demonstrated conclusions. .

.

. [A]s much [certainly]

as is

possible in its class is enough." 6 It is folly to look for strict
necessity in conclusions of practical reason formulating positive
law.
It is this folly, according to Mr. Wu, which has been at the
source of many errors about natural law in the modem schools
of jurisprudence. The "rationalist" philosophers, he says, thought
they could construct from the speculative reason a complete
code of human conduct. Those who rejected this theory rejected the idea of necessity not only in detail but in principle.
Holmes was an example of these, for him "law was experience
not logic" and he failed to see the realism of the Thomistic
theory which finds necessity in the speculative order but variability in the practical order, in determinations of conclusions
and generalities derived from principles.
These determinations the author points out are the work of
the practical reason applying moral principles to every day
conditions and problems facing men in government. He gives
an interesting illustration of the variability of these determinations, in the differences among the members of the United
States Supreme Court in deciding under which 7of two statutes
the Rosenbergs should be sentenced for treason.
This reviewer has known many lawyers and students of
law to be discouraged and disillusioned when faced with determinations of natural law principles and general conclusions. Inspired by a genuine desire for social progress, they
6

Id. at 139.

7 Rosenberg v. United States, 346 U.S. 273 (1953).
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hope for a strict application of principle in settlement of important issues. They see instead a "watering down" of principle and in disappointment are unclear about the utility of
natural law. In FEPC, public housing and public health legislation, to mention a few issues, these men aim their hopes at
the ideal and are dissatisfied with less.
Most citizens in our country today accept in principle the
good of these social issues, but differ with respect to the means
best designed to promote the goodness. The government officials
in dealing with these means must consider many factors and
pressures and look to experience in deciding what course consistent with peace and order will probably best accomplish
the purposes. These prudential judgments are the function of
practical reason. These judgments are not prudential, of course,
if made for personal motives or from personal fears or the
like. The judgments must, as Mr. Wu states, be directed upward toward fuller realization of the common good and individual perfection.
Thomists are advised in this book to take care when discussing jurisprudence with men not of their faith. The discussion, it says, should be held to the level of natural reason
and experience and the Thomist should not require the other
party to "assume his faith" unless the other is willing that the
philosophy be discussed from the standpoint of religion. This
advice should please philosophers of law who, like Lon Fuller,
insist that discussion of jurisprudence be kept upon the philosophical level." The book warns those it advises, however, to avoid
the extreme of refusing to speak of faith as though it were
entirely irrelevant to the science of law.
One might wonder whether the author rejected his own
advice in writing this book. This reviewer thinks not. He set the
stage for discussion by frankly begging his "non-Christian" readers
to forgive passages in the book which flowed from faith rather
than natural reason. He bravely proclaims himself a "Christian
philosopher" of law as others are "Kantian, Marxists" and so
on. His purpose is not to defend natural law on religious grounds
but to show that natural law needs religion and especially
Christianity for clarification and confirmation of the moral precepts. His love of common law may subordinate the sub-title
of his book, but who, knowing his background, can complain
of this bravery and this love.
Roger T. Kiley*
s Fuller, American. Legal Philosophy at Mid-Century, 6 J.LEGAL
457 (1954).
* Justice, Appellate Court of Illinois.

ED.
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TRIEs

AND FDERAL

CoNsTITuTioNs.

By James McLeod

Hendry.' Washington: Public Affairs Press, 1955. Pp. v, 186.
$4.50. Professor Hendry has made an exhaustive and scholarly
analysis of the treaty-making power of four federal states-the
United States, Canada, Australia, and Switzerland. A reader of
this book, bearing in mind the prejudices of its author, can learn
much about the constitutional capacity of these four countries
to make international agreements and about their constitutional
powers of performance.
The title of the book is somewhat misleading. The constitutional aspects of treaties and other international agreements discussed by Professor Hendry are, for the most part, not peculiar
to federal states. Moreover, only in Canada are the constitutional2
powers of the provinces protected against invasion by treaty.
In the United States s Australia, and, to a lesser extent in
Switzerland, treaties can make state lines disappear.
Unfortunately, Professor Hendry's scholarly research is marred
by his strong bias for centralization of political power, nationally
and internationally. To achieve this dubious end, he argues for
greater inroads on state and provincial autonomy, creation of an
executive authority omnipotent in treaty-making, and supranational legislation directly applicable to individuals. Treaties Over
Federal Constitutions would be a more appropriate title for this
book.
What most distresses the author is that Ottawa, unlike Washington, has no plenary power in treaty-making. He notes with
satisfaction that the treaty power of the United States is virtually unlimited, extending perhaps to taking away rights guaranteed to individuals by the Constitution. His own Dominion government of Canada, on the other hand, cannot, merely by making
promises to foreign countries, clothe itself with authority inconsistent with the constitution which gave it birth. The Privy
Council so held in The Labor Conventions Case.4 That decision
denied to the Dominion Parliament power to implement three
International Labor Organization conventions dealing with subjects within the constitutional domain of the Provinces.
The Labor Conventions Case, according to Professor Hendry,
has created a "Canadian dilemma"; has rendered Canada's
I Professor of Law, Dalhousie University.
2 Attorney-General for Canada v. Attorney-General for Ontario, [1937]
A.C. 326 (P.C.).
3 Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416 (1920).
4 Attorney-General for Canada v. Attorney-General for Ontario, [1937]

A.C. 326 (P.C.).
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treaty-performing power "unsatisfactory"; and has deprived
Canada of "a firm and active authority in international affairs." 5
So far as international affairs are concerned, Canada has co-

operated fully with her free-world partners. So far as the domestic law aspects of treaties are concerned, it is a simple matter to respect the constitutional prerogatives of states, provinces
and cantons by including in the treaty a federal-state clause.6

Professor Hendry, however, has no interest in protecting any
system of dual sovereignty against treaty law. His deep hostility
toward a balanced federalism is starkly revealed in these statements:
... the centralization of all forces in the state
7 is not only desirable,
but often politically feasible and necessary."

"The continuous extension of the activities of the federal authority
of that state [Switzerland] into the economic, social and international fields is8 to be recognized as an outstanding example of
wise government.

However, use of the treaty power to make federal states into
unitary states would not satisfy Professor Hendry. Believing
that ".

.

. the need for [an] omnipotent executive in the foreign

field [is] becoming stronger," 9 Professor Hendry advocates "...
a strong executive, having constitutionally a complete discretion to conclude valid international agreements of all types."'' 0
For the United States, Professor Hendry recommends that the
President be given power to conclude treaties and other international agreements subject only to the advice and ". . . aid of
a select committee either from the Senate alone or from both

Houses.""
Switzerland, according to Professor Hendry, is just as reactionary as the United States in failing to recognize the virtues
of an omnipotent executive power in treaty-making. Under the
5 Text at 62, 131.

6 For example, the International Labor Organization Constitution (art.
19, par. 7) provides that the national government of a federal state may
fulfill its obligations to the International Labor Organization by referring
to its "states, provinces or cantons" conventions which the national government "regards as appropriate under its constitutional system . . . for
action by the constituent states, provinces or cantons rather than for federal
action."
7 Text at 176.
8

Ibid.

9 Text at 73.
10 Id. at 166.
11 Id. at 168.
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Swiss Constitution treaties cannot be constitutionally concluded
without legislative approval. Treaties which would bind Switzerland indefinitely or for a period of more than fifteen years are
subject to the approval of the people in referendum. Professor
Hendry is right in concluding that "freedom of the executive in
foreign affairs is indeed impossible under such conditions."'
He is wrong in concluding that such freedom is desirable. Professor Hendry says with reference to the Swiss treaty-making
procedure:
To subject international agreements to the whim of the electorate
would inevitably lead to delay and possible nullification, because
of the public's general incompetence.... Great social and economic
conventions often have to be tested and tried, to determine whether
they are to the general advantage or not. The leaders of the state are
in the best position to decide what is advantageous... 13

Other statements in the book also indicate that Professor
Hendry's Brave New One-World is thoroughly anti-democratic.
For example, he writes about the "great need to break down
the barriers" of national sovereignty and ".

.

. its concomitant

concept of domestic issues to be regulated by the state alone."'14
This destruction of national sovereignty would be achieved by
employing multilateral treaties of the United Nations ".

.

. to

regulate many subjects which not so long ago were considered
of purely national concern."' 15 And, as previously noted, Professor
Hendry would have a virtually omnipotent executive make this
international legislation effective as domestic law. Yet, no person who has participated in the writing of UN treaty law has
ever been elected for that purpose by a vote of the people.
I hope that Professor Hendry's book advocating the Fuhrer
principle in treaty-making is widely read in the United States.
It should encourage favorable action on a constitutional amendment to safeguard the exercise of the treaty-making power.16
John W. Bricker*
3-

13
'-

Id. at 167.
Id. at 79-80.
Id. at 166.

15 Id. at 1.
S.J.R~s. 1, 84th Cong. 1st Sess. (1955), as amended by the Senate
Judiciary Committee (SE. REP. No. 1716, 84th Cong., 2d Sess. (1956)) contains the following substantive provision: "A provision of a treaty or other
international agreement which conflicts with any provision of this Constitution shall not be of any force or effect." See Bricker & Webb, Treaty Law
vs. Domestic Constitutional Law, 29 NoTRa DAM LAw. 529 (1954).
* United States Senator from Ohio. Member of the Ohio Bar.
16
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YOUTH AND THE LAW. By Frederick J. Ludwig.- Brooklyn: Foundation Press, Inc., 1955. Pp. xxii, 386. $5.50. This book is a
comprehensive work on a subject that is alarming jurists, parents, teachers, police, probation officers and indeed anyone who
has any dealings whatsoever with the youth of today. As such,
it is very timely, since it is full of practical information and suggestions. It is thoroughly annotated and documented, with tables of authorities, statutes and cases, plus an unusually efficient index. Not only does the author delve into the history of
laws concerning the young; he gives a factual report of the development of these laws through the years; discusses present
laws and statutes, analyzes their efficacy and makes recommendations for changes where reforms seem indicated. This is an
excellent manual for any student of the law and is strongly
recommended for the student who contemplates practicing in
the state of New York. It also contains good background coverage for the practicing jurist. The book, published under the
auspices of The Youth Counsel Bureau, treats of law from a
national standpoint with understandable emphasis on New York
State. However, there are numerous comparative charts and
tables of statutes showing similarities and variations in the laws
of all the states. These tables contain extremely handy reference
material for the student. It is obvious that intensive thought,
study and research went into the making of this book, and the
author gives credit for great assistance to experienced and able
workers in many fields.
The machinery of the various New York courts, comparable,
of course, to all other state courts, is explained in clear-cut fashion, both as to definite jurisdiction and overlapping authority.
The chapter on "Children's Court ' 2 covers the subject quite fully
with the one exception of the status of dependent children, of
which more mention might have been made. The discussion of
the "History and Rationale of Criminal Responsibility of Young
Offenders" is both informative and thought-provoking. Here,
the author manages to put into the minimum number of pages
a truly remarkable amount of historical data on this particular
phase of the subject. Beginning with the Code of Hammurabi,
he traces the development of the fixing of responsibility through
some 4000 years; touching on changes and additions of the
Mosaic Code, Rabbinic Law, the Talmud, Roman Law and English
Common Law, down to the present juvenile court system. Fur-

I Professor of Law, St. John's University; former acting captain of the
New York Police Department.
2 Text at 51.
3

Id. at 12.

1956]

BOOK REVIEWS

thermore, there are copious footnotes and a wealth of suggested
source material for those who wish to make a more detailed
study of this part of legal history.
There are two reforms which the author is deeply interested
in seeing made. He strongly favors a Unified Adolescent Court,
stating that too many courts have jurisdiction over the 16-21
age group.4 He rather inclines to the belief that rehabilitation
should be the sole goal of the juvenile court system, but admits
that this goal seems unattainable at the present time. He also
favors "youthful offender" treatment for youths of 19 and 20
and discusses this treatment in microscopic detail. His point is
one which is well taken and well argued, but it is still a point
which the thoughtful and experienced jurist might find debatable.
Four chapters deal with the protection of young people. Included in a discussion of protection from sex criminals there is
a very fine comparison of the laws of various states.5 Particular
attention is given to the "indeterminate" sentence whereby imprisonment ranging from one day to a life term is within the discretion of the sentencing judge. 6 His conclusion is that no radical
alteration in the present penal statutes is at present to be desired, since neither psychiatry nor criminal law knows all the
answers.7 With any more leniency in this field, he thinks, people
may well come to regard sodomy as no more serious than spitting on the sidewalk.
In the treatment of the subject of child labor, there is a thorough review of existing laws, plus a list of objectives to be desired when considering further legislation in this field. With
regard to the prevention of narcotic addiction among the young
there is a brief discussion of the history of narcotic addiction
and an exhaustive examination of the adequacy of existing
legislation and international controls." There is some cause for
dissatisfaction here, even though Congress has enacted certain
penal statutes to supplement international agreements. Both
state and federal governments have recently adopted more
stringent penalties for drug violation as well as more widespread facilities for treatment of drug addiction. Still, it is a fact
that drug addiction is on the increase. The author's thought,
implicit throughout the chapter, is that training and teaching
in home, school and church must supplement law to combat
this evil. An admirably concise statement of the laws devised to
4 Id. at 89.
5 Id. at 196.
8 Id. at 197.
7 Id. at 212.
' Id. at 239.
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protect children in civil proceedings completes this phase of the
book and leads naturally into a factual explanation of the laws
governing adoption and guardianship. The material in this latter
field is not applicable to all states in the same degree as it is
in the specific case of New York, but the principles are the -ame.
One of the finest chapters in the book, it seems to this reviewer, is the one concerning parental responsibility in the case
of juvenile delinquency. Here the parent is actually given a
kind word. At the same time the author leaves no doubt that the
parent is basically responsible for the attitudes and habits
formed by the child. He states that the most effective work of
prevention should be done at a very early age, before the youngster has a chance to get into juvenile court. Intensive work at
the street level is required. We must attack delinquency, Mr.
Ludwig believes, where it arises and exists. That would be prevention at its best. It was a bit disappointing that he did not go
more thoroughly into the idea of setting up citizen's groups by
neighborhoods - a program which certain cities have instituted
and which I have already set up in our own community. Experts
in general agree that this is a singularly effective approach to
curbing juvenile delinquency. All states except two, Delaware
and Vermont, have statutes punishing parents for contributing
to delinquency of children.9 To this reviewer, who spent ten
years in the state legislature, both house and senate, helping to
formulate laws and who has, for the past seven years been administering laws as Judge of the Probate and Juvenile Court,
it would be most interesting to know whether the rate of delinquency in those two states is any greater than that of the other
forty-six! After a searching and scholarly presentation of the
facts in this field, the author comes to the conclusion that the
present parent-responsibility statutes are much too broad and
sweeping, and that they should be cut down to dimensions that
can be effectively administered. Only where there is sufficient
proof of a causal relationship between the child's delinquency
and the parent's conduct should it be necessary to convict the
parent. The author says with unassailable logic, "If the end of
preventing delinquency is valuable enough to justify removal
of stigma of criminality in cases in which children are defendants,
then the same end ought not to be disserved to make their parents criminal."' 0
The status and duties of probation officers are explained, with
a suggestion that there should be opportunities for more in9 Id. at 137.
Id. at 152.

10

1956]

BOOK REVIEWS

service training and that provision should be made for scholarships and teachers for this important work."1
There is a chapter devoted to "Federal Procedure and Treatment" of juvenile offenders. There is also a discussion of the
sentencing and committment of minors which includes some
ideas for reform - principally a shift from committment to maximum security type institutions to those of the camp or foster
home types.The "Epilogue," which he calls a "Preface to Reform," sums
up the author's views and the real meat of his book very succinctly and concisely. He observes here that law is limited as
a means of influencing human behaviour, since criminal law
with all its centuries of experience has not been able to build
character and the criminal code offers but feeble competition to
home influences. Progress, he points out, is not always synonomous with lenient treatment of offenders; but neither must punitive proposals be classed as reactionary retrogression. Certain
reforms are needed: the remedy is not new laws, but an awakened community consciousness directed at preventing crime
in the neighborhood.
The planning and general make-up of this book are well and
efficiently done. The chapters follow in logical sequence, and
the subject matter is outlined and brushed in cleanly. The
language is graphic, and not unduly polysyllabic except where
legal terminology demands it- a fact which should increase
its value among those who deal with the young but who have
not studied law. Mr. Ludwig brings to his writing the force of a
varied and brilliant career. He has been teacher, lawyer, policeman and winner of academic honors. He has served as special
counsel to the District Attorney of New York County, and as
counsel to the Mayor's Committee on Teen-Age Drug Addiction,
New York City. He has written many thoughtful, searching
articles on juvenile delinquency. By virtue of his many-faceted
background and his unusual wealth of experience with juveniles
in many fields, he is able to speak with authority on this subject.
In my opinion, his book is a definitive work which should have
great value as a manual, treatise and textbook.
John S. Gonas*

12

*

Id. at 112.
Id. at 129-130.

Judge, Probate-Juvenile Court, South Bend, Indiana.
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CONGRESS
GOVERNMENT BY INVESTIGATION. By Alan Barth. New York:

Viking Press, 1955. Pp. 231. $3.00. A comprehensive look at
the functions and purposes of the congressional investigation.
The author points out the latent evils by a review of their
history and recommends practical remedies.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
OUR NATIONAL CONSTITUTION. By J. A.

Rickard & J. K.

Mc-

Crocklin. Harrisburg: The Stackpole Co., 1955. Pp. 277. $3.00.
The avowed purpose of this volume is as a text and an aid
toward a better working knowledge of our Constitution. Half
the book is devoted to the history of the Constitution and
the other half to a minute explanation of it.
DIVORCE
DIVORCE IN THE "LmERAL" JURISDICTIONS. Edited by David Von G.

Albrecht. New York: Federal Legal Publications, Inc., 1955.
Pp. 48. $2.50. Reprints of talks given by lawyers from each of
the "liberal" jurisdictions - Virgin Islands, Alabama, Florida,
Mexico and Nevada - as to the workings of their respective
divorce laws.
EDUCATION
ACADEMIC FREEDOM IN OUR TIME.

By Robert M. Maclver. New

York: Columbia University Press, 1955. Pp. xiv, 329. $4.00.

The author sees the present day cries of "patriotism" and
"communist" as expressions of dangerous inroads on our
educational system. Mr. MacIver indicates various pressure
elements to be withstood and implores the university to live
up to its heritage as a seat of free expression.
EVIDENCE
FORGERY AND FICTITIOUS CHECKS.

By Julius L.

Sternitzky.

Springfield, Ill.: Charles C. Thomas, 1955. Pp. xi, 101. $4.75.
This book is an effort to expose the methods used by criminals
in forging and passing fictitious checks and to educate the
general public and investigating officer in methods of prevention.

FUTURE INTERESTS
Thomas M. Cooley Lectures. By Lewis M. Simes. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan
Press, 1955. Pp. xxii, 163. $4.00. The sixth in a series of
lectures conducted by the University of Michigan Law School

PUBLIC POLICY AND THE DEAD HAND.

in honor of their former dean. The subject matter concerns
(532)
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itself with the struggle for control of the res between the
living beneficiary and the deceased testator.
INTERNATIONAL LAW
THE STUDY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW.

By Percey E. Corbett. New

York: Random House, Inc., 1955. Pp. vi, 55. $.85. This short
work has a three fold purpose: (1) to present and evaluate
international law up to the present day; (2) to cement its
position in international relations and (3) to recommend
changes of approach and method of study of international law.
JURIES
THE JURY DISAGREE. By George Goodchild & Bechhofer
Roberts. New York: Macmillan Co., 1955. Pp. 212. $2.75.
Twelve people heard the facts. Each in their turn interpret
them according to his own prejudices and insight. With each
juror the reader's judgment is swayed as to guilt in this
fictional mystery.
JURISPRUDENCE
THE RIGHT TO LIE. By A. Delafield Smith. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1955. Pp. xi, 204. $3.50. Conflict between society and man. What duties does one owe to
the other? Where is the individual's proper place in society?
What is his role? These problems and others are discussed in
detail in this provocative work.
JUVENILE COURT
By Frederick J. Ludwig. Brooklyn: Foundation Press, Inc., 1955. Pp. xxii, 386, $5.50.

*YOUTH AND THE LAw.

LABOR LAW
By Edward Peters.
New London: National Foremen's Institute, 1955. Pp. xiii,
223. $4.50. The writer says his approach is hard-boiled, with a
minimum of sweetness and a maximum of light. He pictures
the bargaining table as one of "conflict" and attempts by drawing from many years of experience as a conciliator to suggest methods for better understanding between labor and
management.

STRATEGY AND TACTICS IN LABon NEGOTIATIONS.

LEASES
By Milton R. Friedman. New York:
Practising Law Institute, 1955. Pp. 122. $2.00. The work is
presented not as a legal treatise but as a working tool in the
hands of the professional.. With an emphasis on New York
law, the monograph thoroughly covers all phases in drawing a
lease.

PREPARATION OF LEASES.

* Reviewed in this issue.

NOTRE DAME LAWYER

[Vol. XXXI

LEGAL PROFESSION
How AND WHERE LAWYERS GET PRACTICE.

By Claude W. Rowe.

Durham: The Judiciary Publishing Co., 1955. Pp. xiii, 212.
$5.00. A survey of over 700 lawyers, in all facets of the legal
profession and in every section of the country, aimed at
ascertaining productive methods of adding to a law practice
or indicating where to start one.
NATURAL LAW
*FOUNTAIN OF JUSTICE. By John C. H. Wu. New York: Sheed &

Ward, 1955. Pp. ix, 287. $3.75.
PROFESSIONS
NURSING PRACTICE AND THE LAW. Second Edition. By Milton J.

Lesnik & Bernice E. Anderson. Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott
Co., 1955. Pp. xviii, 400. $6.00. A complete revised and rewritten edition of the 1947 volume entitled Legal Aspects of
Nursing, co-written by a nurse anrI a lawyer. The new edition
encompasses the practical nurse and has extended its coverage of legal status and malpractice.
RAILROADS
THE RAILROAD POLICE. By H.

S. Dewhurst.

Springfield, in.:

Charles C. Thomas, 1955. Pp. ix, 211. $5.50. This is the story
of the protective force of our railroads. It carefully enumerates
the duties of a railroad policeman; it follows his role from
training, through his many-sided activities, with the purpose
of educating the general public that the "cinder dicks" are
something belonging to another age.
TREATIES
*TREATIES AND FEDERAL CONSTITUTIONS. By James McLeod Hendry. Washington: Public Affairs Press, 1955. Pp. v, 186. $4.50.

TRIALS
THE WOMAN IN THE CASE. By Edgar Lustgarten. New York:

Charles Scribner's Sons, 1955. Pp. 218. $3.00. A collection of
four famous murder trials, chosen because of a single factor
contained in each one, the psychology of a woman.
You MAY TAKE THE WITNESS. By Clinton G. Brown. Austin:

University of Texas Press, 1955. Pp. 223. $3.95. An autobiography by a man who has both lived and worked with
the law and who has retained a love of the law. The work
is highly instructive for those who aspire to the courtroom and
yet retains an entertaining flavor.
*
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